Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identi…es the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions.
Introduction
Politicians prefer using vague words and announce several policies in their electoral promises, a practice referred to as "political ambiguity." A standard and classical interpretation of political ambiguity is a lottery, that is, a probability distribution on policies. This can be explained in the following manner: candidates announce a lottery, and voters choose the candidate who announces the better lottery (Zeckhauser, 1969; Shepsle, 1972 ; Aragones and Postlewaite, 2002; Callander and Wilson, 2008) . One possible reason why candidates make such vague promises is because voters have convex utility functions. Zeckhauser (1969) was the …rst to interpret political ambiguity as a lottery, and showed that the median policy, which is most preferred by the median voter, can be defeated by a risky lottery when the voter's utility function is convex. Shepsle (1972) generalizes the …ndings of Zeckhauser (1969) and shows that a Condorcet winner does not exist when voters have convex utility functions. However, they do not establish the existence of equilibria in which candidates announce ambiguous promises. Aragones and Postlewaite (2002) show political ambiguity as an equilibrium phenomenon using voters'convex utility functions. However, they assume that candidates need to provide a positive probability for their most preferred policy. Thus, a campaign promise is always ambiguous when candidates commit to implementing a policy other than their own most preferred policy. To the best of my knowledge, no existing studies show that a candidate chooses to make an ambiguous promise in equilibrium because of the convex utility functions of voters, without any restriction on the candidate's choices.
This study identi…es the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium when voters have convex utility functions, and there is no restriction on the candidate's choices. It extends the standard Downsian model with fully o¢ ce-motivated candidates to allow a candidate chooses a lottery. Voters vote sincerely, and two candidates announce a binding promise before an election: a candidate will implement a policy according to the probability distribution of the announced promise after s/he wins the election. 1 The assumption of a binding promise is employed by electoral competition models in the Downsian tradition, but the Downs model does not consider commitment to a lottery. It is possible to suppose that in this study, the model used implicitly assumes a repeated game between candidates and voters. In order to induce voters to believe a probability distribution announced by a candidate in the future, candidates have
The …ndings are as follows. First, in a deterministic model without any uncertainty, the unique Condorcet winner is the median policy when voters have concave or linear utility functions. However, no Condorcet winner exists when voters have convex utility functions. Therefore, two candidates choose the median policy in equilibrium when voters have concave or linear utility functions, but no equilibrium exists in the case of convex utility functions.
On the other hand, in a probabilistic voting model, where candidates are uncertain about voters' preferences, they choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters'most preferred policies is polarized. Therefore, for political ambiguity to be considered as an equilibrium phenomenon with convex utility functions, voters must be polarized, and voting must be probabilistic.
Most prior studies assume that voters are risk-averse. However, there is no robust and clear evidence that voters have concave utility functions for all political issues. Osborne (1995) states that, "I am uncomfortable with the implication of concavity that extremists are highly sensitive to di¤erences between moderate candidates (p. 275)," and "it is not clear that evidence that people are risk-averse in economic decision-making has any relevance here (p. 276)." Furthermore, Kamada and Kojima (2014) state that, "(e)conomic policy is arguably a concave issue, given the evidence that individuals are risk-averse in …nancial decisions. By contrast, voters may have convex utility functions on moral or religious issues (p.204)."Their …ndings imply that an ambiguous promise tends to be used for non-economic issues, which may be a convex issue. Shepsle (1972) states the following:
In the 1968 presidential campaign, both Nixon's "I have a plan" statements on the Vietnam issue and Humphrey's "law and order with justice" slogan on "the social issue" suggest that equivocal pronouncements during the course of campaign are a common and recurrent theme in American electoral politics. (p.
555)
These are examples of ambiguity regarding non-economic issues, and public opinion on the Vietnam war was almost equally divided and polarized between pro-escalation and antiescalation (Verba et al., 1967) . Therefore, this model shows one possible explanation for an incentive to keep their promises.
why Nixon chose an ambiguous promise.
Through this study, I do not intend to say that convexity of utility functions is the only reason why political ambiguity emerges; many reasonable mechanisms have been suggested, as discussed in the literature review. However, although prior studies recognize the convexity of a voter's utility function as one reason for the emergence of ambiguity, none show it as an equilibrium phenomenon without any restrictions on a candidate's strategy. Thus, one of the main contributions of this study is to show additional conditions (i.e., probabilistic voting and polarization) in which candidates choose a vague promise in equilibrium, given voters'convex utility functions.
Related Literature

Causes of Political Ambiguity
Prior studies use formal models to indicate various mechanisms that generate political ambiguity. There are two main types of models: voter-centered models and candidate-centered models. Voter-centered models suppose that voters prefer a higher degree of ambiguity, and that candidates choose an ambiguous promise to win an election. This category includes models with convex utility functions of voters. Callander and Wilson (2008) candidates are uncertain about the position of the median policy, they may prefer to maintain ambiguity (Glazer, 1990) . This is especially true in primary elections because candidates have less information about voters' preferences (Meirowitz, 2005) . Moreover, if campaign platforms are decided sequentially, the follower, who makes policy decisions later than his/her opponent, has a signi…cant advantage when a Condorcet winner does not exist. As a result, candidates prefer to retain political ambiguity during the early stage of an electoral campaign (Kamada and Sugaya, 2018).
De…nitions of Political Ambiguity
We interpret "political ambiguity"as a lottery that includes several policies; however, it has alternative de…nitions. Some studies interpret a set of policies as an ambiguous policy, and do not consider a candidate's decision-making on a probability distribution in this set (Glazer, 1990 3 Most of these studies suppose that candidates do not have the discretion to decide the probability distribution on policies, which is given exogenously in the model. That is, candidates cannot change the degree of ambiguity totally. On the other hand, prior studies that suppose political ambiguity as a lottery assume that candidates can choose any probability distribution freely. The reality should be between these two de…nitions; candidates have some (but not perfect) discretion to decide a probability distribution. However, this paper supposes political ambiguity as a lottery to clearly investigate the strategic choices of candidates on the degree of ambiguity.
It may be unrealistic that candidates announce a speci…c probability distribution on policies in his/her campaign. There are two justi…cations for this point. First, using words, candidates may induce voters to have speci…c expectations. For example, in Japan, Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe made an ambiguous announcement stating that he will increase the consumption tax rate in 2019 if a severe …nancial crisis (or a similar event) does not occur.
Thus, voters may think that although the probability for such an event is high since …nancial crises do not occur frequently, it is not 100% certain. Second, candidates may induce voters to have speci…c expectations by allocating weights (emphasis) to each policy (Page, 1976 ). 4 Voters believe that a policy with higher weight is more likely to be implemented. These interpretations suppose a probability distribution of an ambiguous promise as beliefs held by voters. In other words, a candidate can use weights or words to induce voters to form speci…c beliefs.
Political Ambiguity and Divergence
The probabilistic voting model adopted here is based on that of Kamada and Kojima (2014) , who suppose that candidates can choose only a single policy (not a lottery). They show that with convex utility functions of voters and a polarized voter distribution, perfectly divergent candidates result in a unique equilibrium. Here, perfect divergence means that without exception, the left candidate chooses a left policy, while the right candidate chooses a right policy. On the other hand, we allow candidates to choose a lottery instead of a single policy, which increases the number of equilibria. Thus, ambiguity can arise in the form of equilibrium strategies in the context of convex voter utilities. In some equilibria, candidates choose the same ambiguous lottery, so policy divergence does not occur. On the other hand, perfectly divergent equilibrium shown by Kamada and Kojima (2014) also exists in this model. Therefore, this model shows that a probability voting model with convex utilities is useful to show not only political polarization but also political ambiguity.
Analysis 2.1 Deterministic Voting
First, this subsection presents the implications of the deterministic model as a benchmark.
Let us denote X as the set of policies, and de…ne g(x; y) as the majority margin for x; y 2 X; the number of voters who prefer x to y minus the number of voters who prefer y to x, where x and y are single policies. A policy x is the Condorcet winner when g(x; y) 0 for all Black, 1948) . Let us denote X as the set of probability distributions over X.
De…ne g(p; q) as the majority margin for lotteries p; q 2 X. We call a Condorcet winner on X a Condorcet winning lottery, which is de…ned as follows:
5 De…nition 1 A Condorcet winning lottery is a lottery p, such that g(p; q) 0 for all q 2
X.
Suppose three policies, X = fL; M; Rg, where an element of X is (p L ; p M ; p R ) 2 X, and p x 0 is the probability that x 2 X occurs, where
suppose there is a population of voters of mass one, divided into three discrete groups, l, m, and r, and the proportion of voters in each group is less than 1/2; that is, no group constitutes a majority. Denote the set of groups as G = fl; m; rg, and its element as g 2 G.
Suppose that members of each group have the following preference relations:
5 This di¤ers from the maximal lottery (probabilistic/randomized Condorcet winner) proposed by Fishburn (1984) . A maximal lottery supposes that voters make a decision after a policy is revealed from each lottery, whereas a Condorcet winning lottery supposes that voters choose before the outcomes of the lotteries are revealed. More precisely, p is a maximal lottery if P x;y2X p(x)q(y)g(x; y) 0 for all q 2 X.
These preference relations satisfy single-peakedness. Furthermore, the median point is M , which is the Condorcet winner in Black (1948) . 6 These preference relations of voters in group (1 + 2v)=3, and v=3, respectively. Thus, the voters in l and m prefer q 2 to q 1 . However, q 2 is also defeated by q 3 with (p L ; p M ; p R ) = (0; 2=3; 1=3). As in these cases, for any lottery, there is another that will receive the majority's support. The sum of the probabilities of choosing each policy is one. Thus, at least one group has a positive probability of its best policy being chosen. This probability can be divided between the remaining two groups'most preferred 6 If a Condorcet winner does not exist, a Condorcet winning lottery does not exist either (Fishburn, 1972) . 7 In the following proposition, Shepsle (1972) On the other hand, if voters have convex utility functions, con ‡icts of interest will arise among them: voters in group m prefer M to q 1 because their utility is maximized when M is chosen for sure. However, others prefer q 1 to M because q 1 is riskier. Thus, both the position of a lottery and its degree of ambiguity matter, and this multi-dimensional space induces the non-existence of a Condorcet winning lottery. 
Probabilistic Voting 2.2.1 Settings
Note that i is not a mixed strategy on X, because the policy is chosen after the election, while in a mixed strategy, a policy is chosen before an election. 8 We also suppose that voters believe that the probability that policy x will be implemented after an election is the same as the weight on x; therefore, candidates can a¤ect voters' beliefs by allocating weights, as Callander and Wilson (2008) supposed.
Candidate i obtains the share of voters given by
! ; where i is chosen by i's opponent, and x i is the weight on policy x. The function : < ! [0; 1] is strictly increasing (
and is strictly concave ( 00 (t) < 0) for all t 2 [0; 1). Since (t) + ( t) = 1,
is the expected utility of a voter in group g when candidate i wins the election. In addition, P
is the di¤erence in the expected utility of a voter in group g between the promise of candidate i and that of his/her opponent. If this is positive (negative), candidate i's lottery gives a higher (lower) expected utility than that of his/her opponent. In the deterministic model, (t) = 1, when t > 0, and (t) = 0 when t < 0. However, in the case of probabilistic voting, even if t > 0, (t) 2 (1=2; 1]. One interpretation of this is that voters make decisions based not only on candidates'policies, but also on other factors, and therefore, their voting behavior is probabilistic. We suppose that an o¢ ce-motivated candidate i maximizes ( i ; i ).
Equilibrium with Convergence
There exist multiple equilibria of this game. In order to clarify a situation where both candidates choose an ambiguous promise, we use the following corollary to show equilibria where 8 The model used here implicitly supposes sequential decision-makings where candidates announce a promise before an election, and decide a policy after an election. On the other hand, if we suppose simultaneous decision-makings, i and a mixed strategy should be identical. 
Equilibrium with Divergence
Denote L i L i , and
We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose v < 1=2. A strategy pro…le with
is a Nash equilibrium when .
Proof See Appendix A.2.
As in Corollary 1, when the degree of political centralization is su¢ ciently small, political ambiguity can emerge. Note that when voters have concave or linear utility functions, both candidates choosing M for sure, is a unique equilibrium.
Kamada and Kojima (2014) consider probabilistic voting where candidates can choose only a single policy (not a lottery) and show that a strategy pro…le with i = (1; 0; 0) and i = (0; 0; 1) is an equilibrium in the case of convex utility functions and a polarized voter distribution. On the other hand, we allow candidates to choose a lottery rather than a single policy. As a result, they may choose partially divergent policies: They combine policy divergence and political ambiguity (i.e., In addition, the following corollary is obtained.
Corollary 3 As
( ) increases, increases.
This corollary has two implications. First, it is less likely to lead to an equilibrium with more divergence, i.e., higher . Because 00 (t) < 0 for all t 2 [0; 1), a policy with more divergence has lower 0 ( ), which decreases . Thus, the condition becomes more di¢ cult to satisfy. Second, if voters are more sensitive to di¤erences between candidates, candidates tend to be converged. Suppose two functions and such that (t) < (t) for all t 2 [0; 1), that is voters are more sensitive to policy divergence with than . Since (t) < (t) for all t 2 [0; 1), 0 (t) < 0 (t) with low t while 0 (t) > 0 (t) with high t where t 2 [0; 1). This means that the condition is more likely to be satis…ed with low , but it becomes di¢ cult to be satis…ed with high .
Discussion
When (i) voters have a convex utility function, and (ii) the distribution of their most preferred policies is polarized, candidates choose policy divergence, political ambiguity, or any combination of the two. As discussed in the introduction, voters may have convex utility functions on non-economic issues. Although policy divergence is observed for some noneconomic issues with polarized voters, such as the debate around same-sex marriage in the United States (Kamada and Kojima, 2014), candidates also prefer choosing an ambiguous position. Another example of political ambiguity is the constitutional reform in Japan.
The Constitution of Japan was enacted in 1947 as the new constitution for post-war Japan. In 1947, Japan was occupied by the Allies, mainly the United States. Thus, the Constitution was written by non-Japanese, although the opinion of many Japanese were taken into account. Therefore, constitutional reform has been a topic of frequent discussion since Japan gained independence. Article 9 is the most controversial, as it prohibits Japan from holding any military power. Nevertheless, Japan has had a defense force that has held 
Conclusion
Prior studies usually interpret political ambiguity as a lottery. This study supposes that voters can choose between lotteries, rather than a single policy. Firther, it identi…es the 9 From the website of NHK (https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/special/kenpou70/yoron2017.html) conditions under which political ambiguity occurs in equilibrium, given the convex utility functions of voters. In the deterministic model, if voters have concave or linear utility functions, the median policy is still the Condorcet winner. However, if voters have convex utility functions, the existence of the Condorcet winning lottery is not ensured because the space of campaign promises has multiple dimensions. On the other hand, in the probabilistic voting model, candidates choose an ambiguous promise in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions and (ii) the distribution of voters'most preferred policies is polarized. Therefore, to have political ambiguity as an equilibrium phenomenon with convex utility functions of voters, voters need to be polarized, and candidates must be uncertain about voters'preferences.
There are several directions for future research. First, it is important to identify the policy issues on which voters have convex utility functions. Second, many extensions of the Downsian model suppose that candidates can choose a single policy only. However, in reality, this is rare. When voters have concave or linear utility functions, the main …nding, where both candidates converge to the median policy, does not change, which may be a reasonable simpli…cation. However, if voters have convex utility functions, the implications can change as a result of allowing candidates to choose a lottery instead of a single policy, as we have shown here. Thus, any extension of the Downsian model should generate additional (or di¤erent) implications by supposing a lottery instead of a single policy. The third issue is to suppose a multidimensional policy space. This paper assumes that all policy issues are separable, but they should be intertwined with each other in reality. Finally, generalization to continuous policy space would be important extensions. Kamada and Kojima (2014) indicate that a "three-point model is advantageous because it is tractable and allows us to 
